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Abstract
This article uses the Venezuelan case to shed light on the potential role
of interest group systems in discrediting liberal democracies and to identify
challenges the region’s democracies are likely to confront in constructing
effective and fair interest group systems. It first analyzes the role Venezuela’s
interest groups played in discrediting its forty-year two-party democracy. It
argues that the discrediting of a system heralded by many as the region’s
“model democracy” cannot be understood by merely assessing how the
structure of the group system excluded certain groups. The study shows that
the inclusion of certain business interests in visible positions of power also
helped discredit the two-party democracy. The article then compares the above
system with the new group system which has emerged since 1998 as part of a
new democratic system inspired by Latin America’s 19th century Liberator
Simón Bolívar. This comparison reveals that the current system inverts the
former system of inclusion and exclusion, even as it has retained a number of
the old system’s less virtuous features. The implications of the Venezuelan
case for the region’s democracies are elaborated in the conclusion.
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Introduction
The role of interest groups in Venezuela over the past fifty years provides
insight into their ability to discredit even liberal democratic systems. It also
signals a number of challenges the region’s democracies are likely to face in
configuring interest group systems that present fair and effective means of
representation. The Venezuelan case offers these insights because it is both a
case of a liberal democratic system that became discredited and one involving
two very different interest group systems that share common challenges.
Broadly speaking, the Venezuelan case affirms a number of common elements
in Latin America’s interest group systems that are identified in the introductory
article to this Special issue. These include: a history of political elitism even
within liberal democracies, the continued practice of political leaders selectively
incorporating certain segments of society and their groups into the political
arena (often referred to as corporatism and associated with the region’s
populists from the early 20th. century) and a history of political corruption.
Specifically, the analysis presented below first examines the role that
interest groups played in discrediting Venezuela’s earlier two-party democracy
(1958-1998). Most scholars contend that the country’s interest groups failed to
underpin what many considered a “model democracy” because they failed to
represent numerous important social constituencies, largely by excluding them
from the formal political process. However, I contend that the explanation also
requires an assessment of which interests were included and prominently
visible within the political establishment. My study shows why the inclusion of
3

leading elements of business in this two-party democracy undermined efforts to
overcome the public’s view of the government as corrupt and unresponsive.
This paved the way for the rise of Hugo Chávez and the new interest group
system that has emerged since he took office in 1999. Based on this analysis,
the article draws out some of the vulnerabilities which architects of today’s
Latin American democracies might want to avoid.
Second, the analysis compares the emerging contours of Venezuela’s
current interest group system with those of its predecessor. This comparison
reveals that the current system can be understood as inverting the former
system of inclusion and exclusion even as it has retained a number of the old
system’s less virtuous features. This second analysis points us towards a
number of enduring challenges that Venezuela and the region’s democracies
are likely to confront in configuring interest group systems.

Questions Raised by Political Developments in Venezuela since 1958
The political developments of Venezuela since 1958 present several
important questions for scholars of power groups, interests and interest
groups. First, why did a forty-year old system of interest groups in a
democratic regime collapse and what role did interest groups play in that
collapse? Second, what precisely characterizes the recent reconfiguration of
interest groups since its collapse and how does it compare to its predecessor?
The collapse of Venezuela’s “model democracy” poses a puzzle, especially
for scholars of interest groups. Venezuela’s democratic system dates back to
4

1958 when Venezuela’s last dictator, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, was overthrown.
Venezuelans, including the elite, had grown weary of Pérez Jiménez’s flagrant
use of oil money to enrich his cronies. Eager to avoid the political cleavages
which had produced Pérez Jiménez’s 1948 overthrow of an earlier nascent
democracy, Venezuela’s three leading parties agreed to cooperate in a new
democracy at a meeting held at the Venezuelan sea-side town of Punto Fijo.
With the subsequent withdrawal from the pact of the Democratic Republican
Union (Unión Republicana Democrática—UDR), the democratic era that
followed was characterized by alternation between the two remaining parties in
the presidency and top cabinet positions. These parties were the Democratic
Action (Acción Democrática—AD) and the Committee for the Political
Organization of an Independent Electorate (Comité de Organización Política
Electoral Independiente—COPEI). Thus, we can qualify the subsequent
democracy as a two-party democracy or as the Punto Fijo democracy.
Very soon after its inception, many considered this system a “model
democracy” in a region plagued by authoritarianism (Alexander 1964; Martz
1966). Venezuela’s central political institutions, in particular those structuring
interest groups and their relationship to the democracy’s two political parties,
attracted attention as a potential blueprint for consolidating democracy
elsewhere (Martz and Baloyra 1976; Martz and Myers 1986). The arrangement
did, in fact, work fairly smoothly for thirty years or so. Scholars in the early
1990s even predicted that Venezuela’s well-established two-party democracy
and interest group system would be better able to absorb anti-neoliberal
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sentiment than others in the region (Haggard and Kaufman 1992). As “the
leading example of intensely competitive, broadly participatory electoral politics
in Latin America”(Martz 1977: 93) analysts expected Venezuela’s enduring
democratic institutions to help political leaders contain social unrest and forge
a pro-neoliberal political consensus (McCoy and Smith 1995:12).
By the early 1990s, however, these predictions proved unduly optimistic.
Venezuela could no longer be considered exceptional. Beginning in the 1980s,
voter abstention increased (Buxton 2001-73) and there was a loss of confidence
in both the AD and COPEI. Matters came to a head following the December
1988 election of Carlos Andrés Pérez as president. Pérez had run on the
promise of restoring the prosperity he had presided over during his earlier
presidency in the midst of the 1970s oil boom. Faced with declining revenue
from oil as world oil prices dropped, and rising international debt, Pérez was
forced to implement austerity measures shortly after he was elected. In
response, riots broke out across the nation in which about 1,000 people were
killed. Venezuelans subsequently became less willing to vote for either of these
two parties (Maingón and Sonntag 2000), let alone to identify as members of
them (Morgan 2007; Morgan 2011). Electoral support for the AD and COPEI
had dropped into the single digits by the presidential election of 1998.
Instead, public sympathies turned to those who opposed the two-party
dominated system of democracy including the junior military officer, Hugo
Chávez Frías. Chávez galvanized public concern with the apparent inability of
the government to deal with Venezuela’s mounting economic and social
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problems. He gained broad support for his two failed coup attempts in 1992
against the unpopular Pérez (Constable 1992; Olmos 1992a; Olmos 1992b) and
won the 1998 presidential election with the widest margin of victory in
Venezuelan history (57%). This turn of events in Venezuela poses a particular
challenge to those who study interest groups in Venezuela as well as the
theories that the case bolsters. For this reason, scholars must reconsider the
nature of interest groups in Venezuela and their potential role in the system’s
demise.
Venezuela’s political transformation since 1999 also calls for special
attention from scholars of interest group systems. Soon after his election,
Chávez oversaw a re-writing of the national constitution that, as I describe
below, called for a new vision of democracy. This vision was inspired, in part,
by Simón Bolívar. Bolivár was one of the major architects—liberators—of Latin
America’s independence from Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The country was renamed the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to reflect this
shift. Hence, we can qualify this new democracy as a Bolivarian democracy
(Smilde 2011). Chávez has since survived a coup attempt in 2002 and won
three presidential elections. By referendum in 2009 he secured a
constitutional amendment that allows presidents to seek re-election
indefinitely. He is expected to win re-election in 2012.
Since Chávez took office in February 1999, there has been a major
reconfiguration of interest groups and their relationship to the government. As
a consequence, there have also been changes in group influence on public
7

policy. But what exactly is the nature of this reconfiguration? And how new is
it? It is only very recently that scholars have begun to address this question
with empirical research. For this reason, even those who study the matter
have argued that all we really have are “emerging fragments of Venezuela’s
Bolivarian democracy” (Smilde 2011: 2). Furthermore, much of what we know
does not come from those who set out to study interest groups. Rather it
comes from those who consider “how collective life is created…through
participation in the myriad institutions…that make up Venezuelan society”
(Smilde 2011) and who “explore the alliances, conflicts and mutual
empowerment of state and society” (Fernandes 2010: 5). From this research
we can begin to identify the main contours of what, in the parlance of this
volume, we call power groups, interests and interest groups in Venezuela’s
Bolivarian democracy. As I describe below, recent empirical research
illuminates a new landscape of inclusion and exclusion within Venezuela’s
Bolivarian democracy.
The Venezuelan case permits us a rare opportunity to explore the scope
of variation in interest group systems that might occur within the same broadly
similar economic and cultural conditions. The analysis below thus considers
the main contours of Venezuela’s current system in relationship to its
predecessor. It considers how the particular constellation of power groups,
interests and interest groups which made Venezuela the envy of so many for
decades might be related to the contours of the mercurial terrain of Venezuela’s
current system of power groups, interests and interest groups. A comparison
8

of the two systems also allows us to identify some important continuities
between these two interest group systems.

The Politicization and Exclusion of Interests and Interest Groups in a
Two-party Democracy
To understand the role of interest groups in the loss of public support for
the region’s “model democracy,” it is important to place them in the context of
Venezuela’s highly centralized political system. This centralization of party
authority contributed to two discrediting features of Venezuela’s two-party
interest group system. It drove the politicization of interest groups and
rigidified the interest group system such that it was unreceptive to emerging
societal interests.

Political centralization
From 1958-98, Venezuela’s political parties, and in particular their
leaders, had an extraordinary degree of control over this political system. First,
party leaders exerted control by deciding who could run for public office
(Coppedge 1994:20-22; Myers 1986: 133). As a result of party control over
nominations, only those who demonstrated loyalty to the party had an
opportunity to run for elected office. Second, the party leaders exerted control
by constraining the choice which citizens had regarding who would represent
them. Voters opted for parties, not individuals, when they went to the polls to
elect their representatives for everything from their municipality to the national
9

legislators. This made it virtually impossible for leaders from outside the party
to emerge and win political office (Coppedge 1994:22-23). Third, the members
of the national legislature (Venezuela’s congress) did not constitute the central
node of power within the party as might be assumed (Coppedge 1994:23-26).
Rather, congressional representatives tended to vote along party lines and
follow the decisions made by members of the central executive committees of
their parties, many of whom did not hold elected office (Coppedge 1994: 24).
Indeed, the members of the political parties’ Central Executive Committee
(CEN) made most of the important political decisions (Martz 1966: 214-222).
This centralization of power no doubt helped contain potential conflicts
among political elites, one of the primary concerns of the architects of the
democratic transition in 1958 (Levine 1973; Martz 1966; Myers 1986: 131).
Yet, this centralization also created incentives for elected officials to value party
loyalty over representation (Crisp 2000:11) and, therefore, to disregard their
constituents (Buxton 2001: 222; Morgan 2011). These incentives help explain
why so many Venezuelans felt that the two major parties did not represent
their interests (Morgan 2007) as well as why party leaders were so resistant to
political reforms (Buxton 2001:226; McCoy and Myers 2004:7; Molina 1998;
Naím 2001). The leaders of the AD and COPEI were unwilling to let go of their
tight grip on the political process (Crisp, Levine, and Rey 1995:150; Jácome
2000).
Centralization of power within the parties fostered two features of
Venezuela’s interest group system which further discredited the two-party
10

democracy. First, it fostered the politicization of interest groups. Interest
groups, we might imagine, would be all the more essential in a political system
such as this, where elected officials seemed more preoccupied with satisfying
party leaders than their constituents. And yet, interest groups in Venezuela
were often limited in their ability to effectively represent societal interests by
their lack of autonomy from political parties. The parties penetrated interest
groups to an unusual degree and thereby reduced their effectiveness at
aggregating the interests of those in society for whom such groups ostensibly
spoke (Coppedge 1994).
Party leaders in Venezuela, like their counterparts in Mexico’s
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI),
which governed Mexico for close to seventy years down to 2000, went beyond
the efforts of political leaders throughout the region and instituted a type of
party corporatism.(1) Part of this strategy involved incorporating emergent
societal interest groups into the political process. Party leaders also sought to
mobilize electoral support by linking both workers and the rural poor to
political parties (Collier and Collier 1991). For instance, leaders of the AD
promoted peasant leagues and unions in the 1940s as they sought to galvanize
public support for their party (Hillman 1994: 81; Levine 1973). Once the AD
leaders gained power, they helped these organizations attract members by
granting them access to decision-making in the political process (Martz
1966:156). This created “a liberal democratic regime in which labor has
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traditionally been incorporated through a party-mediated process” (McCoy
1986-87:107).

Centralization and political party control of interest group activity
Party leaders in Venezuela also had a more general “preoccupation with
controlling social organizations” or interest groups (Coppedge 1994:29). We see
this preoccupation in the politicization of leadership contests in a wide range of
interest groups. Just as union leaders competed as representatives of distinct
parties, so leaders of the student movement and of professional associations
eventually competed on party platforms (Coppedge 1994; Hellinger 1991).
Once under the leadership of a party loyalist, an organization could help
the parties by endorsing parties, providing logistical support for electoral
campaigns or extolling elected party leaders publically in the event they were
criticized (Coppedge 1994:27). The parties sought to co-opt leaders of such
groups by granting them privileged positions in government and thereby
capturing the support of new groups, like neighborhood associations which
emerged in the 1970s to demand better public services (Coppedge 1994:29;
Hellinger 1991: 168). When these and other associations failed, the parties
sometimes established their own organization parallel to the original civil
society group, but with greater access to the political process than the original
group (Coppedge 1994:29).
The politicization of interest groups undermined their independence from
party leaders and further constrained citizen efforts to aggregate their interests
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in groups capable of expressing their voice to decision-makers. For example,
the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de
Venezuela—CTV) squelched labor movements that challenge AD policies
(Hellinger 1991: 178-181) and tended to be less likely to strike during AD
presidencies (Coppedge 1994:34). CTV leaders also frankly acknowledged that
they rarely made decisions without first consulting the individuals who were
responsible for labor matters in the party (Coppedge 1994:31-32). So the CTV
often subverted the interests of their constituents in order to remain loyal to
party leaders (Hellinger 1991:73, 159). While we know that labor leaders
within the party did actively debate their strategy (Ellner 1989) and the CTV
opposed neoliberal economic reforms with greater militancy than its
counterparts in Latin America (Burgess 1999; Murillo 2000), the strategic
options available to CTV leaders were more often than not constrained by their
dependence on, and loyalty to, the AD.
The centralization of power also contributed to a second feature of the
interest group system that discredited Venezuela’s two-party democracy. It
created incentives for party leaders to turn a deaf ear not only to the demands
of reformers but also to the many new interests and interest groups which
emerged as Venezuelan society transformed. The nation’s economic growth
stalled in the 1980s in the wake of the debt crisis and sliding oil prices.
Neoliberal reforms compounded the negative effects of these trends, further
eroding the domestic productivity of both agriculture and manufacturing
(Roberts 2003a:60). These economic transformations pushed and ever-growing
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part of the population into poverty and the economic insecurity of informal
economic activity (Roberts 2003b:59). This growing population of urban poor
(Buxton 2001:222; Buxton 2003; Canache 2004), along with other emerging
interests, like intellectuals (Hillman 2004), a growing civil society (Salamanca
2004), and junior military officers (Aguero 1995; Norden 1996; Tinkunas 2004),
felt excluded from the political process. Thus, scholars contend that
Venezuela’s political institutions failed, in part, because they remained rigid in
the face of societal transformations (Crisp 1996; McCoy and Myers 2004:7) and
excluded a range of new societal interests (Crisp 2000; Crisp and Levine 1998;
Crisp, Levine, and Rey 1995).
In sum, the limited autonomy from partisan politics of many interest
groups and the exclusion of others who remained autonomous from the partydominated political process, are two ways that the role of interest groups can
help explain the public’s growing disillusionment with Venezuela’s political
establishment by the 1990s. But this was not the only role that interest
groups played in the demise of the region’s model democracy.

The Inclusion of Business Power Groups and Interests as a Catalyst for
Opposition
The role that business played in Venezuela’s interest group system also
discredited the two-party democracy. Formal inclusion of leading members of
Venezuela’s business elite into the political sphere and the marked influence of
power groups from several key business sectors characterized Venezuela’s
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interest group system during the two-party democracy. It is my contention
that it was the formal inclusion of business elites in visible positions of political
leadership, in particular, that discredited Venezuela’s political establishment.
Such visible influence, in a system where the interests of select business power
groups penetrated the state and a rising tide of corruption scandals brought to
light the less virtuous by-products of business intimacy with politicians, likely
tarnished the business community as much as political leaders. Thus, the
visible inclusion of Venezuela’s business elite helped galvanize public support
for opponents to the political establishment (Gates 2010a: 59-81).

The party leader-business elite connection
For decades, party leaders in Venezuela included members of
Venezuela’s business elite. For example, representatives from business
associations made up a disproportionate part of the commissions appointed by
political leaders to facilitate consultation with society over myriad policy
decisions (Crisp 2000). According to my research, individuals with significant
prior business experience were also consistently included in the national
legislature and the economic cabinet throughout the era of two-party
dominance. Both reflect the preferences of party leaders. Those included in
the national legislature earned the trust of party leaders, because, as we have
seen, it was party leaders who nominated national legislative candidates to the
party lists. Members of the business elite were nominated to fill 6.2% of the
positions available in the federal legislature between 1959 and 1998 (Gates
15

2010a: 73). At their peak, during the legislative session beginning in 1984,
they represented 9% of all legislators.
Individuals with significant prior business experience played an even
more crucial role in shaping Venezuela’s economic policy. Those individuals
nominated to craft this policy had earned the trust of the president, as the
president appointed these cabinet-level posts. An analysis of the biographies of
every economic cabinet member from 1959-98 reveals that, over half of
Venezuela’s economic cabinet posts were occupied by individuals with
significant prior business experience. Moreover, in the final administrations
during the 1990s, business elites represented an even higher share of those
holding economic cabinet positions (Gates 2010a: 75). In the final Caldera
presidential administration (1994-98), for example, such individuals held 68%
of the economic policy-making positions.
The appointments of business executives to prominent policy-making
positions publicly affirmed the potent influence of several noteworthy power
groups within the two-party democracy. Foreign oil companies and domestic
state-dependent businesses formed two such power groups within the interest
group system of Venezuela’s two-party democracy. The power of both can be
traced to the centrality of oil in Venezuela’s economy ever since it was
discovered in the early part of the 20th century. Today, for example, Venezuela
has one of the largest oil reserves in the world and oil contributes 95% of the
country’s export earnings, 55% of federal revenue and about 30% of
Venezuela’s Gross Domestic Product (Central Intelligence Agency 2012). Since
16

the development of Venezuela as an oil exporter, Venezuela’s governments have
had to negotiate the terms of their dependence on the powerful foreign oil
companies who have always had more capital to explore and refine the oil.
Venezuela’s status as an oil producer has also enticed businesses to orient
their profit-making strategies around fostering close ties with government
agents, as the state possessed such immense wealth derived from oil (Naím and
Francés 1995).

Oil and oil industry power groups
The multi-national corporations, who had their hand in exploring for oil,
were the first important power group in all Venezuelan governments, including
the two-party democracy (Tinker Salas 2009). Venezuela stands out in the
region as the only country that permitted foreign-owned oil companies (“big
oil”) to operate its oil industry for decades after Mexico’s dramatic
nationalization of oil in 1938. Even after nationalization in 1976, Petroleos de
Venezuela (PDVSA) was, “never fully controlled by any of the governments that
technically owned it” (Parenti 2006:8). This was partly because these
governments left the former executives of the big oil companies in charge of
PDVSA. This choice effectively displaced the Energy Ministry in setting
Venezuela’s oil policy (Lander and Lopez-Maya 2002: 22).
As a result, the nation’s oil policy after nationalization was set by the
cadre of Venezuelan engineers and managers within PDVSA who were
cultivated by the big oil companies as part of their broader project to legitimize
17

a foreign owned oil industry (Tinker Salas 2009). These executives shared big
oil’s view that “what was good for the oil industry was good for Venezuela”
(Tinker Salas 2009: 5). It was under their leadership that PDVSA flagrantly
disregarded the policy of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), an organization that Venezuela helped found before nationalization.
Instead of cooperating with other oil producers to maintain high prices by
restricting production, PDVSA became increasingly committed to a profit
strategy of increased production (Lander and Lopez-Maya 2002). Thus, in the
eyes of a many Venezuelans, PDVSA did not have the best interests of the
nation in sight(Tinker Salas 2009: 231). Rather, it operated like a power group
within the state.
PDVSA managers further enhanced the influence of big oil within PDVSA
with a series of reforms in the 1990s. For example, they opened the nation’s oil
industry to increased direct investment of multi-national oil corporations
(Lander and Lopez-Maya 2002:21). To attract these foreign investors, the
government relinquished “its ability to tax the transnationals,” resulting in a
net loss in government revenue from oil (Lander and Lopez-Maya 2002:21).
The historical influence of big oil together with its seemingly imminent return
as a potent power group in the 1990s may, in the end, have been a liability for
the two-party democracy (Gates 2011). The power group of transnational oil
companies was, however, not the only important power group in Venezuela.
Venezuela’s oil rich state attracted demands from a host of societal
interests who pressured the state to make particular economic and social
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policy choices (Karl 1997). Chief among these was the second key power
group: Venezuela’s peculiar domestic business community. It was peculiar
because its most successful members were those who could secure a piece of
the state’s wealth (Naím 1984). We see the expansion of this segment of the
business community, in particular, during the oil boom of the 1970s. The
Carlos Andrés Pérez administration’s (1974-1978) sought to “sew the oil” by
directing a growing share of state resources towards new state entities, often in
joint ventures with favored private companies. The distribution of resources to
these new state entities, however, operated outside the normal channels of
accountability (Kornblith and Maingon 1985).

Increasing political corruption
The numerous corruption scandals from this period attest to the fact
that many government agents accepted kickbacks and political leaders used
their influence to reward financial contributors to their campaigns with these
lucrative deals. This pattern of “doing business” with the state created a
business community anxious about securing and retaining state access. As I
have shown elsewhere (Gates 2010a: 85-110), this constituted a form of power
group influence that would come to haunt the two-party system.
My systematic analysis of 392 of Venezuela’s most high profile corruption
scandals from 1959-98, reveals how such scandals brought to light the less
favorable aspects of the intimacy between the country’s political establishment
and the business elite. When corruption involves business, it might entail
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business executives bribing government agents, or government agents extorting
fees from business managers. Either type of transaction might take place in
order to facilitate some form of government authorization that a business might
need to operate or to make a profit. In my corruption scandals analysis, 36%
implicated businesses in a wide range of transactions (Gates 2010a: 63).
Moreover, the research suggests that, during the 1990s, corruption scandals
implicating business had become more prevalent and were focused on two
major corruption scandals.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the media exposed a torrent of corruption
scandals linked to two policy areas. One was a policy to extend a lower foreign
exchange rate to businesses that imported necessary goods and services than
was available to the public-at-large called the Regime of Differential Charges
(Régimen de Cambios Diferenciales—RECADI). The other was financial sector
regulation. All types of businesses were suspected of having secured dollars at
the preferred exchange rate without proper justification. Bankers were
suspected of hastening the failure of so many banks by making bad loans to
their cronies. These scandals associated business with what appeared to be
systemic corruption and included allegations against high-level government
officials. Moreover, they revealed that the policies in these areas had
institutionalized incentives for both state officials and business people to
pursue illicit transactions (Pérez Perdomo 1992: 5). These scandals not only
discredited business, they also suggested that Venezuela’s political
establishment, an establishment which placed business executives in visible
20

positions of leadership, had institutionalized a bias towards certain societal
interests (Gates 2010a: 64-71).

The consequences: a failed “model democracy”
Not surprisingly, the public lost faith in both the political establishment
and the business community. The percent of Venezuelans who had a lot of
confidence in the major business interest group, FEDECAMARAS, the
Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Federación de Cámaras y
Asociaciones de Comercio y Produción de Venezuela) declined more than any
other leading interest group, including labor and the Catholic Church. Those
with a lot of confidence in FEDECAMARAS declined from 66% of the population
in 1985 to just under 10% in 1998 (Gates 2010a: 42). Labor also fell in public
confidence, but far less extensively. Venezuelans who had a lot of confidence
in the major organized labor interest group, the CTV, dropped from 36% in
1985 to just over 10% in 1998. Furthermore, those dissatisfied with the
political establishment and concerned with corruption had less confidence in
business (Gates 2010a: 79). This suggests that the public’s declining
confidence in business could be linked to the visible ties between business and
the political establishment and the rising tide of corruption described above.
This growing cynicism regarding business, not just the generalized
frustration with the political establishment, throws light on how the political
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opposition was able to gain traction in the 1990s. It is important to
understand this cynicism because disillusionment with existing political
leaders does not necessarily generate support for a particular opposition
candidate. Rather, it may just provoke apathy and depress voter turnout. It is
only when voters are optimistic about a particular opposition candidate that
they are likely to turn out to vote and defeat the political establishment
(Radcliff 1994). In Venezuela, the opposition gained greatest traction with new
movements, like the labor union-based Causa R and Hugo Chávez’s Movement
of the Fifth Republic (Movimiento de la Quinta República—MVR), that
mobilized around class-based economic concerns of the economically
marginalized (Buxton 2001; Hellinger 2003), rather than subverting class
difference in multi-class parties (Myers 1998). Thus, to understand the demise
of Venezuela’s “model democracy” which, in regard to interest group
representation was far from a model democracy, we must explain the appeal of
such opposition movements.
As I have shown elsewhere (Gates 2010a: 56), it was Hugo Chávez’s
ability to earn support from the anti-business voters, not just from those
dissatisfied with the existing political establishment, which helped him defeat
the other political outsiders running for president in the 1998 election.
Furthermore, I have shown that his anti-business supporters felt optimistic
about the future, a finding that suggests that his supporters were optimistic, in
part, because they trusted he would dismantle a political system in which
political leaders had such close ties to business (Gates 2010a: 79). In other
22

words, the candidate singled out as the one most qualified as a political
outsider, was the one who appeared least tied to a key system insider—
business.

Inverting Inclusion and Exclusion of Power Groups, Interests and Interest
Groups in a Bolivarian Democracy
The emerging contours of a new interest group system in Venezuela’s
Bolivarian democracy reveal an effort to invert the constellation of interests
that were included and excluded in the two-party democracy. As such, they
expose an underlying critique of the two-party system and a concerted effort to
move away from the features of that system deemed most repugnant. Thus,
while these changes certainly usher in a new era in Venezuela’s interest group
system, this era is intimately related to its former self. Below, I elaborate just
three of the ways that the current system of interests and interest groups
invert the prior system. First, the system contains an underlying critique of the
power of parties within the prior system. Second, it incorporates a critique of
the particular nature of bias within the prior interest-group system. Third, the
current system includes a host of newly empowered citizens who are among
those previously marginalized.

The marginalization of traditional political parties
The first way that the current system inverts the prior two-party system
is that it has marginalized political parties from the process whereby societal
23

groups press their claims on the state. While Chávez formed an organization
that coordinated his early electoral campaigns, the Movement of the Fifth
Republic (MVR), he was careful not to call it a party. He did not call for the
formation of a political party which he would head until 2007, after his
government had successfully survived an attempted coup, a general strike, a
recall election and his own re-election. The discrediting of the two parties at
the helm of the prior system made it unfeasible for candidates who sought to
compete with pro-government candidates to use either of these parties. Since
1998, the opposition to Chávez has also struggled to consolidate new parties.
The marginalization of parties reflects the deep skepticism, some might
even say cynicism regarding parties and their relationship to interests and
interest groups in the two-party system. That system had claimed to be a
democracy “of” and “for the people.” But by the 1990s, many Venezuelans felt
betrayed and no longer believed the democracy was “for the people” (Smilde
2011:24). This skepticism made Chávez’s campaign rallying cry to hold new
elections for a constituent assembly that would rewrite Venezuela’s
constitution a popular one (Ellner 2008:111). The constituent assembly, it was
proposed, would replace any newly elected congress of representatives selected
by leaders of political parties.
The Constituent Assembly put forward a new conception of democracy
“by the people” (Smilde 2011:24) which marginalized, but did not eliminate, the
role of parties. With pro-government representatives far outnumbering the
opposition in the newly elected Constituent Assembly, the assembly embraced
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Simón Bolívar’s idea that the government, and its leaders, can and should
strive to interpret the collective will of the people. To realize this Bolivarian
ideal of democracy, the Constituent Assembly promoted participatory
democracy even as it ratified enhanced powers for the executive (Ellner
2008:111). In calling for participatory democracy, the representatives sought
to distinguish their proposed institutional structure of the democracy from the
concept of “representative democracy” associated with Venezuela’s by then
widely discredited two-party democracy. A central element of this new concept
of democracy was that citizens should ideally find ways to participate in
governing without the mediation of parties and their attendant politicized
interest groups.
The current government has sought to promote citizen participation
unmediated by parties, rather than representation through parties, via a
panoply of initiatives. These initiatives are in keeping with the 1999
Constitution’s call for the state to “‘facilitate’ popular input in decision making
(article 162)” (Ellner 2008:177). In the first few years after Chávez was elected,
many Chavistas echoed the Constitution’s call for “constituent assemblies” by
calling on their universities, workplaces, and neighborhoods to hold such
assemblies as a means for members to have a direct say in their institutions
(Ellner 2008:178). The government more actively promoted such initiatives
after these “grassroots” Chavistas—those without ties to the MVR or their allied
political parties (Ellner 2008:180)—proved pivotal in Chávez’s defeat of an
attempted coup in 2002 and after Chávez defeated the recall election of 2004
25

(Ellner 2008: 121).i (2) XXX . The Chavistas increased influence was due to
their pivotal role in spreading the word that a coup attempt had occurred and
in rallying support to bring Chávez back.
By 2005, these government-led and often state-financed initiatives
included thousands of Urban Land Committees (CTUs) constituted by
neighborhood residents charged with distributing land deeds, and water
commissions through which local residents proposed and oversaw public
works. Beginning in 2006, thousands of “small neighborhood councils” or
consejos comunales were charged with dispersing government allocated
resources for their community’s infrastructure and social projects (Ellner 2008:
126, 128).
While political parties have been marginalized since 1998, the
government has demonstrated an increased willingness to institutionalize
interest mediation with the formation in 2007 of the United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela—PSUV)(Ellner 2008:172,
193). The formation of the PSUV has been accompanied by a shift in the
government’s favored discourse from a call for “participatory democracy” to a
call for “21st century socialism.” This rhetorical shift, together with the
centralization of power in the executive branch and the lack of democracy with
the new party (Ellner 2008:193), contradict the goals of participatory
democracy and may signal a diminishing commitment to such an ideal (Smilde
2011:11). Thus, despite the efforts to promote participatory forms of
governance, observers posit that Venezuela’s Bolivarian democracy is best
26

understood as an uneasy hybrid between direct or participatory democracy and
representative democracy (López Maya and Lander 2011); one in which parties
participate in regular elections, but other modes of direct relations between
citizens and the government exist as important forums for interest mediation.

Marginalization of some traditional interest groups
The second way that the current system inverts the prior two-party
system is what David Smilde calls “transitions in citizenship” in which those
citizens and their interest groups which previously had privileged access to the
state have become marginalized (Smilde 2011: 22). In doing so, the
protagonists of the new system reveal their underlying critique of the bias
within the previous interest group system towards some of society’s more
economically advantaged members.
The government has marginalized the formal interest groups that were
historically important within the two-party system, such as the Catholic
Church, labor’s CTV and business’ umbrella group (FEDECAMARAS). This has
been done by endorsing the creation of new “parallel” organizations (Ellner
2008:147). While hardliners in the government advocated such an
endorsement early on, it was not until the head of FEDECAMARAS was
appointed as temporary president during the short-lived coup attempt in April
2002, and the two-month general strike was led by labor’s CTV and business’
leading peak association, FEDECAMARAS in late 2002, that their argument
gained traction (Ellner 2008: 143). Thus, in April 2003, Chávez government
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allies promoted the formation of a new labor federation, The National Workers
Union (UNT) (Ellner 2008: 155).
It was at this point that the government also stepped up its efforts to
counter the political influence of FEDECAMARAS by fostering a new “business”
sector. Within this new sector are government financed cooperatives,
enterprises “comanaged” by worker unions and company management, and
previously failing private enterprises now run by workers with some
government input (Ellner 2008: 169). These new enterprises have bolstered
some previously existing but marginalized business associations, such as the
Venezuelan Federation of Chambers and Associations of Craftsmen, and Micro,
Small and Medium-sized Industrial Enterprises (Federación de Cámaras y
Asociaciones de Artesanos, Micros, Pequeños y Medianos Industrias y
Empresas de Venezuela—FEDEINDUSTRIA), and some new “parallel” business
associations (Ellner 2008: 170).
The present government has also curtailed the more informal, but no less
potent, influence of power groups in the old system. For instance, the
government has sought to move decision-making over the oil industry from
inside the state-owned oil company PVDSA, where power group influence has
historically resided, to the Energy Ministry controlled by political
appointments. It has also sought to improve the government’s share of oil
income by shifting away from taxing profits towards royalty payments by the oil
companies; the latter being easier to collect. It has also moved to restrict new
private investment in the industry (Lander and Lopez-Maya 2002:22).
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In order to achieve these goals, the government undertook a controversial
restructuring of PDVSA’s leadership. It replaced its board of directors in March
2002 (Subero 2004:379). The government resorted to even stronger action
after frustrated middle managers within PDVSA resisted the new board. These
middle managers helped lead a national strike in April 2002 that culminated in
pushing Chávez out of office for two days (Lander and Lopez-Maya 2002:23)ii
and participated in the general work stoppage called for by both business and
unions in December 2002 (Parenti 2006: 9).(2) The government subsequently
purged 18,000, more than a third, of PDVSA’s middle managers (Parenti
2006:9; Subero 2004:380). In early 2005, the Venezuelan government
continued its internal transformation of PDVSA by overhauling Citgo, its
subsidiary in the United States. The government replaced Citgo’s chief
executive and its board. In their place, the government installed managers
more favorable to the government’s new priorities (Romero 2005).
With the above pattern of exclusion, the government has transformed the
remnants of the prior interest group system. As interest groups operating in a
context where their sponsoring political parties have largely collapsed, these
formerly corporatist institutionalized interests no longer subvert the interests of
their members or constituents to political parties. This transformation has
forced these traditional organizations to rethink their strategies. They have
transformed with varying degrees of efficacy and organizational resources from
system insiders to system outsiders. The prominent role of some of these
previous insider organizations in opposing the current government, most
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notably FEDECAMARAS’s role in the 2002 coup attempt, has contributed to
some skepticism regarding the “civility” of such organizations which freely
embrace the mantel of “civil society.”

Inclusion of “new citizens”
The third way that the current interest group system inverts the prior
two-party dominated interest group system is by affirmatively including some
of the societal interests that were previously excluded—by creating “new
citizens” (Smilde 2011: 21). These affirmative initiatives at inclusion reflect a
desire to rectify the biases of the prior system that, in essence, ignored the
effective representation of some of society’s most economically marginalized
members. We see the hand of the government in affirmatively establishing new
venues for some of Venezuela’s previously excluded societal interests to
participate most forcefully in 2004, after Chávez defeated the recall election
(Ellner 2008: 121-126). This is when the contours of what some have called
Venezuela’s “state-sponsored participatory democracy” emerge more clearly
(Smilde 2011).
The government’s efforts have been directed especially towards segments
of the population whose interest groups were either co-opted by their leaders or
whose interests were ignored in the old two-party system. Thus, much of the
current government’s efforts have been oriented towards sectors of society like
the urban and rural poor who were excluded from the formal economy. The
emphasis on the neighborhood as a primary organizing unit in many of these
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initiatives reflects the recognition that many Venezuelans primarily identify
with their place of residence, rather than their workplace. We see this
emphasis not just in the previously mentioned Urban Land Committees (CTUs)
and the consejos comunales, but also in the form that many of the
government’s leading social initiatives have taken. For instance, the health,
educational and job training “missions” have all been organized around
neighborhoods. The government has perhaps most directly sought to promote
the participation of those in the informal sector via its ambitious workercooperative program.
As Sujatha Fernades’ ethnographic research in Caracas’ barrios (urban
slums) reveals, the government has also assisted in amplifying the voice of
cultural protagonists who call attention to the persistent forms and historical
role of racism in Venezuelan society (Fernandes 2010). Obscured by the
euphemistic vision of Venezuela as a mixed-race society embraced by the
political leaders of the two-party system, racial stereotypes have long operated
to further marginalize many of Venezuela’s urban and rural poor. By
sponsoring community-based religious festivals that celebrate Afro-Venezuelan
and indigenous leaders and funding community radio stations, the government
has affirmed the value of previously maligned social identities. In fostering “the
public recognition of ignored spaces and hidden histories” (Smilde 2011: 22),
the government has expanded the discourse within “civil society” to include
their voices.
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Government initiatives such as those above are in line with an emerging
critique of the idea that a civil society free of the government’s hand will
necessarily represent all of society’s interests and thus ensure a fair and just
democracy. Instead, many scholars of Latin America’s emerging democracies
have concluded that civil society is often quite limited in its capacity to
represent society in all its interest to government (Auyero and Swistun 2009;
Roberts 1998; Shefner 2008). These limits were not due to the lack of
independence of civil society groups, like Mexico’s urban colonia residents who
sought to secure infrastructural projects and land titles from the government
(Shefner 2008), or the residents of a highly polluted neighborhood on the
outskirts of Buenas Aires who sought to clean up their neighborhood (Auyero
and Swistun 2009). Rather, the inefficacy of these civil society efforts was due
to their lack of resources and access to political power. In short, their failures
reflect the fact that civil society in their societies, as in all societies, tends to
mirror that society’s stratification. For this reason, scholars have argued that
civil society tends to re-enforce society’s inequalities (Roberts 1998). This
insight raises questions about the ideal relationship between civil society and
government. Should government more actively foster venues for those least
likely to mount effective civil society organizations to represent their interests?
Venezuela’s Bolivarian democracy represents an experiment in answering this
question in the affirmative.

Continuities across Two Interest Group Systems
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Despite these dramatic changes, there remain a number of mostly
troubling continuities between the system of power groups, interests and
interest groups in Venezuela’s Bolivarian democracy and that of the two-party
system. These continuities underscore the enduring challenges of interestgroup mediation in Venezuela and likely elsewhere in the region. As such, they
should also temper any temptation we may have to either lionize or demonize
the Chávez regime.
First, like the Punto Fijo system, the current system is one of selective
inclusion and exclusion; a system similarly “structured around networks of
privileged access and loyalty” (Buxton 2011: xx). In other words, both systems
are biased, albeit towards different segments of society. While bias may be
inevitable in any interest group system, the particular forms that bias takes
varies in these two cases. Taking note of the ways that bias differs,
nonetheless, can point us towards the tenor and content that critical voices
within a given system are likely to take. They also indicate the likely forms that
subsequent interest group systems are likely to take. As we have seen above,
some of the main contours of the current interest group system represent a
direct inversion of the prior system. We also saw in the previous system, how
such biases can catalyze discontent in a context of economic austerity and
social polarization. The current system shows how the selective exclusion of
those previously favored power groups and interest groups fueled a powerful
opposition that rattled political stability. Thus, regardless of the degree to
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which either of these two group systems measure-up to the ideal of
consolidated liberal democracy, they both reveal the liabilities of bias.
Second, the politicization of interest groups that undermined the
representativeness of interest groups in the earlier two-party system continues
in the current Venezuelan system of interest mediation. This politicization has
taken place, despite the less prominent place of political parties in Venezuela’s
Bolivarian democracy. Government financing and involvement in a host of the
programs described above create the expectation, if not direct pressure, on
recipient groups to incorporate into their financed activities political
promotions or to filter out negative representations of the government
(Fernandes 2010; Schiller 2011). Access to government financing can also
tempt local leaders to subvert the aims of their organization, and thus the
interests it allegedly represents, in favor of government goals and/or their own
personal benefit (Fernandes 2010; Pilar García-Guadilla 2011). It is important
to recognize that protagonists of such state-supported efforts to promote
participatory democracy often actively work to retain their autonomy from their
government benefactors (Fernandes 2010; Smilde 2011). And yet, government
financing today, much like the party-led penetration of interest groups in
Venezuela’s earlier system, creates conditions ripe for cooptation and
clientelistic control of local community leaders.
A third similarity deserves to be mentioned because it exposes the
inability of either system to hold the government accountable. This similarity
is the corruption endemic to both systems (Gates 2010b). The quality of
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corruption today bears a resemblance to the corruption typical early in the
Punto-Fijo democracy. As in the first few decades of the two-party democracy
(Capriles 1991:38-9; Capriles 1993: 210), corruption today seems to take root
among state officials who allocate funds for social programs (Gates 2010b); that
is, in the many state-sponsored efforts to promote participatory democracy
(Ellner 2008: 184). In these contexts, state officials can too easily abuse their
discretion over state funds to favor particular groups or friends and family, or
to siphon off resources for their own personal benefit. The latter seems to have
been a particular problem with the current government’s worker-cooperative
initiatives (Collier 2006; Ellner 2007), the majority of which have failed to
prosper (Ellner 2008: 130).iii (3)
Finally, just as the former system fostered a domestic business
community dependent on the state, the current system has fostered its own
state-dependent business allies. This so-called Boliburguesia includes not just
the “new businesses” mentioned above, but also traditional businesses in
state-dependent sectors of the economy such as banking and construction.
These businesses constitute an important power group today, as they have in
the past.

The Lessons and Implications of the Venezuelan Case
The subtitle of this Special Issue of the JOURNAL asks whether this is a
new era for interest groups in Latin America or more of the same. With regard
to Venezuela, there is no doubt that the past twenty years has seen major
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changes. In many ways, there has been a transformation in the interest group
systems that is more extensive than in most Latin American countries. But
exactly in what ways is this a new era in terms of the interest group system?
And, what lessons can we draw from Venezuela’s experience for emerging,
transitional and consolidating democracies of the region?
Before we turn to Venezuela’s current group system, we should not
overlook the lessons we might draw from Venezuela’s earlier two-party
democracy for democracies in the region in the years ahead. The analysis of
this interest group system points to several potential vulnerabilities for
democracies that adopt neoliberal reforms. These policies have been
associated with aggravating social polarization and complicating the legitimacy
of their political champions (Roberts 2008). Indeed, the unpopularity of
neoliberal reforms have given rise to a new cast of political leaders who oppose
Washington D.C.’s favored economic agenda of free trade, small states and
deregulation (Baker and Greene 2011). Few would have guessed, however, that
Venezuela would lead the region in this new direction precisely because of its
interest group system. To explain the collapse of this system, I have argued,
we must consider who the old interest group system included as well as who
they excluded. Such an analysis reveals how the old system privileged
business interests by granting business executives prominent positions within
government and permitted key segments of the business to operate as a power
group that penetrated the state apparatus. The Venezuelan case, thus,
exposes the vulnerability of democracies characterized by inclusion of business
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power groups and interests. It suggests that such inclusion of elitist interests
can be a catalyst for opposition, and hence the demise of an existing
democratic government.
The emerging contours of Venezuela’s current group system highlight
several innovations that should not be dismissed as necessarily out of step
with what we might expect to find in other parts of Latin America. For
example, the fact that today’s system is an inversion of Venezuela’s Punto Fijo
interest group system suggests that new configurations of interest groups in
Latin America are likely to reflect popular opinion regarding the immediately
prior system of power groups, interests and interest groups. The Venezuelan
case, in particular, illuminates the liabilities that may be embedded even
within a democracy which for decades was widely accepted as the region’s
“model” of liberal democracy. We might, then, expect innovations in Latin
America’s group systems that emerge in the 21st century to reflect popular
sentiment regarding the particular biases and perceived failings of the third
wave of democratization that swept the region in the latter part of the 20th
century. Indeed, we might consider whether public opinion regarding bias
within the interest group systems of their democracies, not just their policy
positions regarding neoliberal reforms, helped bring the region’s anti-neoliberal
presidents to power.
Many have argued, however, that Venezuela’s current group system is
nothing new. Instead, they consider it a throwback to populism. Putting aside
the heated debate about how to define populism (Conniff 1999; Roberts 2006)
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and the wide range of governments to which the term has been applied (Gibson
1997; Roberts 1995), Chávez shares a number of the characteristics with the
original populists (Ellner 1999; Roberts 2003b). Like his predecessors of the
1930s, he uses anti-elitist rhetorical claims and cultivates electoral support
through government financing of programs that create conditions ripe for
clientelistic exchanges of material services for government loyalty (Ellner 2008:
172). He also similarly advocates an active role for the state in the economy,
albeit not precisely in the same way as earlier populists. Chávez’s evident
charisma and the centralization of authority in the executive branch also
parallels the personalism of many earlier populists. While there are some
resemblances to earlier populists, such a comparison obscures how
Venezuela’s current political reality is situated within its more immediate
context and hence its relevance for other democracies in the region.
There are several other ways that Venezuela’s current interest group
system is not new. These continuities with Venezuela’s immediately prior
Punto Fijo system signal some of the challenges democracies in the region are
likely to face. The fact that both systems of interest groups are biased in that
they affirmatively include some while excluding other societal interests and
their groups, affirms that all interest group systems are biased in some way
(Jordan and Thomas 2004). More precisely, it underscores how hard it may be
to avoid bias in constructing electorally-based regimes in the region. In the
often highly unequal societies outside the world’s economic core, the interests
of some in society, even among the elite (Gates 2009), are often at odds with
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those of others. To create viable electoral coalitions, then, political leaders in
the region have historically sought to cultivate a loyal electoral base with select
segments of society (Collier and Collier 1991), thereby creating biased interest
group systems. The resurgence of similar “populist” politics when democracy
returned to the region, even among the region’s neoliberal champions, further
affirms the ubiquity of bias (Gibson 1997; Roberts 1995). Can democracies in
the region reasonably be expected, then, to avoid bias within their interest
group system? If not, then what is critical is the nature of the bias and, I
would argue, how that bias interacts with the stratification likely to emerge
within civil society.
Finally, the common politicization of interest groups in both systems also
underscores the risks of affirmative inclusion of certain interests by the
government or party. While such actions may constitute a means to create a
counterweight to stratified civil societies, they also tend to subvert the capacity
of new forms of sponsored interest groups to effectively represent society. How
can, then, the region’s democracies navigate the problem of a stratified civil
society likely to leave unarticulated the demands of key sectors of society, while
avoiding the pitfalls of politicizing civil society? My analysis of Venezuela
suggests that these are formidable challenges for any aspiring democratic
protagonists.

Notes
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1. For an analysis of party corporatism as it operated under the PRI, see
Rosenberg (2001).
2. The alignment of the short-lived Carmona interim presidency with the
interests of the old managers at PDVSA was evidence by the fact that one of the
few appointments Carmona made was to reinstate the ex-president of PDVSA
whom Chávez had fired (Lander and Lopez-Maya 2002:23).
3. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the host of reasons why
current pressures for greater transparency have had limited success. Briefly,
however, these include a number of government acts which have curtailed the
freedom of the press, the lack of democracy within the PSUV and the
susceptibility to clientelistic control of new social accounting councils designed
to ensure local oversight of government funds (Ellner 2008: 184-5; Gates
2010b).
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